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September  17,1984 I  would  first  of  all  I ike  to  say  how  grateful  am  to 
you  Mr.  Chairman  and  to  the  Ferti I iser  Institute  for  pro-
viding  me  with  this opportunity  to  say  a  few  words  on  a 
topic  not  only  of  vital  importance  to  8  million  European 
-F1rmers  and  their  families  and  to  270  million  European 
consumers  but  also  of  at  least  some  passing  interest  to 
the  fertiliser  industry  and  to  its  clients  around  the 
world.  refer,  of  course,  to  the  subject  of  European 
agriculture  - and  to  its  place  in  international  trade. 
am  also  grateful  to  have  the  opportunity  of  visiting 
San  Francisco  again  - albeit  far  too  briefly.  Little 
did  realise  as  strolled  the  streets  and  rode  the 
trollies  in  July  with  my  family  that  would  be  back  so 
soon  in  the  city  on  the  bay- the  city  with  a  cool  climate 
but  a  warm  heart. 
l. 
When  taf~ed  to  the  organisers  about  the  area  should 
try  to  cover  this  morning,  it  was  suggested  that  I  should 
not  restrict  myself  to  European  agriculture  but  should 
perhaps  also  share  some  thoughts  with  you  on  trade  in 
general  between  the  European  Community  and  the  United 
States.  wi  II  have  a  shot  but  should  warn  you  that 
my  remarks  wi  I I  have  a  marked  agricultural  flavour. 
Let  us  start  by  looking  at  the  rising  tide  of 
American  involvement  in  external  trade. 
. I .... For  something  like  one  hundred  years  after  the 
Civil  War,  American  involvement  in  foreign  trade  never 
rose  above  3-4  percent  of  the  Gross  National  Product. 
In  the  1970's  it  exploded  and  foreign  trade  now  accounts 
for  some  12  percent  of  American  GNP.  One-fifth  of 
American  industrial  production  is  exported,  two-thirds 
of  its  wheat  and  two-fifths  of  its  rice,  soyabeans  and 
cotton.  In  the  mid -1950's  when  the  United  States 
secured  its  waiver  from  the  obligations  of  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (the  GATT)  in  the  field 
of  agriculture,  American  farm  exports  were  relatively 
sma 1 1 •  The  main  concern  of  the  US  Administration  in 
2 • 
those  days  was  that  the  international  trading  rules  should 
not  interfere  too  drastically  with  the  operation  of  the 
internal  American  agricultural  market  administered  and 
regulated  by  various  Federal  programmes.  Then  came  the 
great  agricult~ral  boom  fuelled  by  expanding  economies 
around  the  world,  pressing  food  needs  and  a  low  dollar. 
And,  between  1970  and  1980,  the  va 1 ue  of  US  ag r i cu 1-
tural  exports  jumped  from  $7  bi 11  ion  to  over  $41  bi H  ion. 
Certainly,  they  dipped  in  the  two  following  years  but 
1984  agricultural  exports  are  forecast  to  rise  by  9% 
to  some  38  bio  $  - an  enormous  expansion  over  14  years 
ago  and  a  great  tribute  to  the  American  farmer  and  to 
the  suppliers  of  his  inputs. 
. I ... 3. 
In  al 1  this,  the  European  Community  has  proved  a 
very  valuable  customer.  Total  trade  between  the  EC 
and  the  US  in  1982  amounted  to  some  90  bio  $-one-third 
of  total  world  trade.  As  Secretary  Shultz  said  in  Brussels 
some  months  ago  -
11We  must  be  doing  something  right 11 • 
And,  despite  talk  of  the  EC
1 s  protectionist  Common 
Agricultural  Policy,  we  remain  the  American  farmers• 
biggest  customer.  Even  with  a  dollar  at  record  heights 
the  Community  ran  a  substantial  deficit  in  agricultural 
trade  with  the  United  States  in  1983  of  some  $5  billion 
when  we  took  $7.6  bill ion  worth  of  US  farm  products  compared 
with  the  $5.9  billion  you  sold  to  Japan  and  the  $4.9 
bill ion  to  the  whole  of  South  America.  There  is  much 
talk  in  Kansas  City,  in  Chicago  and  perhaps  here  in  San 
Francisco  of  the  United  States•  image  as  a  reliable  supplier. 
It  seems  to  me  that  the  Community  is  a  very  reliable  cus-
tamer  - and  in  hard  cash. 
Another  aspect  I  would  like  briefly  to  mention  is  the 
maintenance  of  what  we  call  the  one  world  trading  sy..;;tem. 
World  free  trade  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term  does  not 
exist- like  absolute  zero  in  physics  it  is  a  concept 
more  for  the  laboratory  than  the  real  world.  But  we  have 
made  enormous  progress  in  reducing  barriers  to  world  trade, 
and  this  we  should  remember  has  coincided  with  the  greatest 
increase  in  prosperity  the  world  has  ever  known. 
Between  1926  and  1935  the  volume  of  world  trade  of  manu-
factured  goods  col lapsed  by  28  percent.  In  the  decade  up 
. I ... to  1972  the  volume  of  world  trade  rose  by  8.5  percent 
per  year.  Even  after  the  oi 1  shock  it  grew  by  4.5  per-
cent  a  year.  How  did  this  affect  the  United  States  ? 
Between  1929  and  1939,  the  Gross  National  Product  in 
real  terms  hardly  changed.  Between  1939  and  1982,  it 
went  up  in  real  terms  by  a  factor  of  five.  The  face 
of  the  United  States  has  changed,  thanks  in  good  measure 
to  foreign  trade. 
4 . 
This  world  prosperity,which  whatever  its  imperfections 
and  shortfal ls,was  hardly  dreamt  of  forty  years  ago.  But 
it  depends  on  a  fragile  balance  of  obligations  and  advan-
tages  hammered  out  within  the  international  trading  rules 
of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  And  pre-
eminent  in  that  is  the  responsibi 1 ity  of  the  United  States 
and  the  European  Community  who  are  the  two  major  players 
on  the  world  trading  stage.  Together,  as  have  just  said, 
they  account  for  something  ike  one-third  of  world  trade 
and  thus  have  a  major stake  in  the  maintenance  of  the  one 
world  trading  system.  I f  e v e r  t h e r e  we r e  t o  come  a  ... d a y 
when  trade  barriers  would  start  escalating  between  us  and 
the  shutters  were  to  come  clanging  down  on  both  sides  of 
the  Atlantic,  then  the  world  would  be  threatened  with  a 
move  back  to  the  wasteland  of  the  1930's.  And  that  is 
the  real  - the  unavoidable  answer  - to  all  those  on  either 
side  of  the  Atlantic  who  want  new  trade  barriers,  and  yet 
further  trade  barriers,  imposed  to  help  industries  in  dif-
ficulty.  for  whatever  reason" 
. I ... 5 • 
that 
But,  realise/there  are  influences  at  work  in  the 
other  direction.  No  European  1 iving  in  the  United  States 
can  fail  to  be  impressed  by  the  gradual  shift  in  power 
and  influence  in  this  country  towards  the  South  and  the 
West.  do  not  make  this  point  in  any  critical  sense. 
It  is  a  fact  of  geography  and  history.  And  Europe  must 
learn  to  live  with  it.  But  combined  with  the  virtual 
disappearance  of  the  generation  of  American  Statesmen  who, 
in  the  1940
1 s  and  1950
1 s,  who  were  much  mixed  up  with  the 
European  affairs,  there  is  a  natural  tendency  for 
the  new  power-brokers  of  this  country  to  ask  themselves  -
Is  not,  and  this  is  a  very  real  question  here  in  Cali-
fornia,  the  real  world  for  the  United  States  the  Pacific 
and  the  South  ?  -
Then,  there  is  of  course  a  rising  tide  of  protectionist 
sentiment  around  the  land.  There  is  no  monopoly  of  this  on 
this  side  of  the  Altantic  as  we  in  Europe  know  only  too  wel 1. 
But  the  strength  of  the  dollar,  competition  from  across  the 
Pacific  rim,  not  only  from  Japan,  and  the  fact  that  a  number 
of  developing  countries  have  had  to  retrench  substa~ial ly 
on  their  purchases  have  meant  a  tough  time  for  American 
exporters  and  a  tough  time  for  al 1  Americans  who  compete 
with  imports  from  abroad.  In  the  Community,  we  welcome 
the  stand  which  the  Administration  has  taken  against  both 
versions  of  the  Wine  Equity  Bi  11,  domestic  content,  the  15 
percent  steel  quota  bil 1  and  on  copper.  But  you  will  under-
stand  me  if  we  say  we  are  sti 11  worried  by  other  decisions 
. I ... 6. 
and  ones  which  have  still  to  be  made  by  the  Administration 
over  the  next  couple  of  months. 
But,  Mr.  Chairman,  have  sketched  out  very  briefly 
enough  of  our  general  background.  This  is  as  necessary 
as  the  background  in  any  portraito  Let  us  come  to  the 
subject  on  which  warned  you  I  might  concentrate  - - -
agriculture.  What  are  we  arguing  about  ?  Are  we  a 
threat  to  the  American  farmer  ? 
Anyone  from  Europe  who  goes  about  and  speaks  in  the 
United  States  quickly  realises  that  mentioning  the  Common 
Agricultural  Policy  does  not  lead  to  a  burst  of  enthusiastic 
cheering  from  the  back  of  the  hall.  But  the  Common  Agricul-
tural  Policy  is  so  festooned  with  myths  that  it  is  attimes 
from  outside  Europe  difficult  to  see  the  pol icy.  So  let  me 
explode  a  few  myths. 
vias  a  Common  Agricultural  Pol icy  necessary  ?  Answer,  yes. 
Because  when  the  original  Six:  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Belgium, 
Luxemburg  and  the  Netherlands,  set  up  the  European  Community 
in  1957  their  first  task  was  to  free  trade.  This  could  be 
done  relatively  easily  for  industrial  products  by  cutting 
tariffs.  But  the  varieties  of  agricultural  protection 
in  the  individual  states  were 
I  so  manifold  and  ingenious  that  cutting  tariffs  would  have 
been  meaningless.  Europe  could  not  unite  half  in  free 
trade  and  half  not.  So,  the  only  solution  was  to  establish 
a  unified  Common  Agricultural  Policy. 
. I ..  ~ Was  not  its  aim  to  pamper  the  European  farmer  ? 
Answer,  no.  The  aims  were  very  much  those  of  US  farm 
pol icy.  To  increase  productivity,  to  secure  a  fair 
standard  of  living  for  the  farm  population,  market 
stabi I ity,  the  assurance  of  an  adequate  food  supply 
and  reasonable  consumer  prices. 
But  has  not  this  led  to  a  vast  and  over-blown  agri-
cultural  population  ?  Answer,  no. 
Over  the  last  twenty  years,  the  EC  agricultural  labour 
force  has  dropped  by  more  than  50  percent  from  19  mi  I I ion 
to  less  than  8  mi  II ion.  That  meant  the  loss  of  one  job 
every  minute  in  European  farming. 
the  average  farm  size  doubled. 
During  the  same  period, 
But  has  the  CAP  feather-bedded  European  farmers  ? 
Answer,  no. 
In  fact,  since  1975,  EC  farm  incomes  have  fallen  well 
below  industrial  EC  incomes. 
Has  the  CAP  led  the  EC  to  be  a  net  food  exporter  ? 
Answer,  no. 
Whilst  we  are  net  exporters  of  some  products  thanks  to 
increases  in  productivity,  our  overal I  trade  deficit  in 
food  and  agricultural  goods  grew  from  some  $14  bi I 1 ion 
in  1973  to  $23  ni Ilion  in  1982. 
. I ... 
7. All  this  has  to  be  seen  against  the  background  - as 
pointed  out  earlier  - that  the  Community  is  the  American 
farmers•  biggest  customer  with  a  net  agricultural  surplus 
for  the  United  States  in  the  Community  market  last  year  of 
$5  billion. 
The  factors  which  are  responsible  for  the  hard  times 
that  American  farm  exports  have  been  going  through  are  not 
the  European  Community  but  cut-backs  in  purchases  by  deve-
loping  countries  strapped  for  cash,  record  US  production, 
client  countries  changing  their  suppliers  because  of  dif-
ficulties  in  other  sectors- such  as  textiles- and  above 
all  the  high  level  of  the  dollar. 
Let  me  quote  SecretaryBlock  in  a  recent  speech: 
11This 
leaves  our  agricultural  sector  increasingly  sensitive  to 
the  fact  that  qver  the  last  three  and  a  half  years  the 
8. 
value  of  the  dollar  has  risen  about  30  percent.  This  has 
caused  our  farm  products  to  become  more  expensive  in  foreign 
markets.  Our  competitive  position  has  been  weakened1  As  a 
result  the  value  of  our  agricultural  exports  has  declined 
by  $5-6  billion.
11
•  This  was  in  a  speech  he  made  on  26  June 
since  when  the$  has  continued  on  its  inexorable  climb;, 
In  fact,  the  major  argument  between  us  has  centred  on 
subsidies.  The  claim  is  often  made  in  the  U.S.A.  that  the 
Europeans  are  selfishly  and  massively  subsidising  their 
agricultural  exports,  thus  capturing  overseas  markets  and 
. I ... 9. 
taking  bread  out  of  the  mouth  of  the  American  farmer. 
We  point  to  the  existence  of  massive  agricultural  subsidies 
on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  The  total  Community  budget 
for  1983  amounted  to  some  $23  bi I lion- less  than  one  per-
cent  of  Community  GNP- of  which  $15  billion  was  spent  on 
agriculture.  But  price  support  alone  in  the  United  States 
for  that  year  amounted  - according  to  the  report  of  the 
Counci I  of  Economic  Advisers  - to  $18.9  bi II ion  -with 
an  extra  $9o4  billion  for  PIK.  offer  these  observations 
not  to  score  points  but  to  register  the  fact  that  subsidies 
to  agriculture  are  a  political  fact  in  the  modern  world. 
Perhaps  we  are  all  sinners  in  eyes  of  the  Lord. 
The  last  major  round  of  trade  negotiations,  the  Tokyo 
Round,  which  was  concluded  in  1979,  recognised  agricultural 
subsidies  as  a  fact  of  I ifeo  And  the  rules  laboriously 
hammered  out  allowed  subsidies  to  agricultural  exports  pro-
viding  that  th~se were  not  used  to  take  more  than  an  equi-
table  share  of  the  world  market.  What,  our  American  friends 
ask,  is  equitable?  We  explain  that  this  is  rather  like 
d r a f t i n g  a  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a n  e I e p h a n t •  D  i f f i c u I t ,  b  u"1:  i f 
one  were  to  enter  this  room, 
the  kind  of  animal  involved. 
think  most  of  us  could  guess 
Let  me  give  just  two  sets  of  figures.  In  the  1970's, 
Community  exports  of  wheat  and  wheat  flour  combined  rose 
from  10  percent  to  14  percent  of  the  world  market.  Cer-
tainly  an  increase  and  an  increase  in  exports  which  were 
subsidised.  But  the  United  States  share  of  the  world  trade 
. I ... rose  from  34  to  46  percent.  I  make  this  point  not  in 
an  accusatory  fashion,  but  simply  to  say  that  it  would 
be  difficult  to  conclude  from  this  that  we  were  breaking 
the  international  trading  rules  or  hogging  the  world 
market. 
We  talked  about  this  in  Brussels  in  December  1982  when 
Secretary  Shultz  and  four  of  his  Cabinet  col leagues  sat 
down  with  Gaston  Thorn,  the  President  of  the  European  Com-
mission,  and  his  team. 
tural  export  subsidies. 
We  agreed  to  talk  about  agricul-
And  we  have  made  some  progress. 
The  discussions  cleared  away  a  great  deal  of  statistical 
undergrowth  of  mismatching  figures  and  misconceptions  and 
enabled  us  to  explain  with  a  common  statistical  base  that 
we  were  operating  fully  within  the  concept  of  an  equitable 
share  of  the  world  market  and  thus  fully  in  accordance 
with  the  international  trading  rules. 
But  we  have  gone  further  than  this.  We  have  started 
discussions  aimed  at  clarifying  the  international  trading 
rules  on  subsidies.  And  in  the  work  of  the  Committee  set 
up  in  Geneva  under  the  GATT  to  look  systematically  at  alI 
forms  of  agricultural  protection  - and  the  rules  for  agri-
culture  in  world  trade  - there  is  close  and  constructive 
collaboration  between  the  EEC  and  the  American  side. 
We  have  also  embarked  in  the  European  Community  on  a 
reshaping  of  our  Common  Agricultural  Policy  which  has,  to 
a  large  extent,  become  the  victim  of  its  own  success. 
1  0 • 
. I . . . As  the  Commission  we  put  forward  some  major  proposals  to 
our  Council  of  Ministers  for  changes  in  the  Common  Agricul-
tural  Pol icy  and  for  1 imitation  of  support.  The  package 
we  put  forward  was  based  on  three  main  principles 
(a)  restriction  of  the  volume  of  production 
Jn  which  Community  farmers  receive  a 
guaranteed  price  - something  we  have 
been  urging  the  Counci 1  to  do  for  years 
(b)  a  requirement  that  EC  farmers  should  foot 
the  bil 1  for  their  own  overproduction  ; 
(c)  a  reduction  in  the  gap  between  the  Community 
and  world  prices. 
And  we  got  this  package  through.  In  March  of  this  year, 
the  Community  Counci 1  of  Ministers  adopted  a  major  package 
of  reforms.  This  included  a  freeze  on  milk  prices,  the 
introduction  of  restrictive  quotas  which  will  reduce  sub-
sidised  dairy  production  by  7%  with  harsh  penalties  for 
any  additional  quantities,  and  a  stringent  pol icy  for 
1984-85  prices  of  al 1  other  products  with  price  reductions 
in  a  number  of  cases.  In  addition,  since  in  politics  we 
have  to  tackle  one  thing  at  a  time,  the  Commission  has 
made  no  secret  of  its  plans  to  propose  for  next  year 
meaningful  cuts  in  grain  prices  following  this  year's 
one  percent  cut.  The  dairy  farmers  caught  it  this  year; 
our  cereal  growers  know  it  is  their  turn  next. 
. I ... 
l I • I 2. 
This  package  represents  a  major  shift  in  the  direction 
preached  for  years  by  American  critics  of  the  Common  Agri-
cultural  Policy  and  should  be  welcome  news  for  American 
farmers. 
But  the  package  has  some  external  effects.  The  pro-
posals  would  require  substantial  sacrifices  from  EC  farmers 
and  have  not  generally  been  well  received  by  them.  When 
the  EC  is  asking  its  own  farmers  to  make  sacrifices  and, 
in  fact,  to  control  their  production,  which  would 
be  of  substantial  benefit  to  our  trading  partners,  the 
Commission  believes  that  it  is  not  unreasonable  for  the 
Community  to  review  its  treatment  of  competing  imports 
provided  that  this  is  done  strictly  in  accordance  with 
the  international  trading  rules  set  out  in  GATT. 
So  let  me  spell  out  what  we  propose  in  particular  in 
relation  to  grain  substitutes.  The  EC  cannot  implement  a 
guarantee  threshold  for  grain  and  move  its  prices  towards 
those  of  its  competitors  without  stabi 1 ising  imports  of 
grain  substitutes.  These  displace  both  American  corn  and 
Community  grown  cereals  in  animal  feed  and  have  the  effect 
of  forcing  more  EC  grain  onto  the  world  market.  This  is 
not  a  proposal  aimed  specifically  at  the  United  States. 
Substitutes  are  imported  from  a  wide  range  of  sources  and 
satisfactory  arrangements  have  already  been  made  for  manioc 
and  bran  coming  from  Southeast  Asia  and  elsewhere.  What 
we  now  have  in  mind  is  to  stabilise  the  imports  of  other 
. I . . . 1 3 . 
important  substitutes  - corn  gluten  feed  for  example,  a 
by-product  of  corn  sweetener,  the  booming  production  of 
which  in  the  United  States  is  due  in  no  small  part  to  the 
protective  and  high  priced  arrangements  enjoyed  by  sugar 
growers  and  of  ethanol  production  encouraged  by  tax  exemptions. 
Imports  of  corn  gluten  feed  into  the  EC  have, in  fact, 
soared  from  700,000  tons  to  3.5  mil 1 ion  tons  since  1974. 
Our  intention,  therefore,  for  corn  gluten  feed  is  not  to 
ban  imports  or  reduce  them,  but  to  stabi 1 ise  these  imports 
after  discussion  with  the  EC
1 s  major  suppliers  against 
appropriate  compensation  on  our  part  - and  in  ful 1  accor-
dance  with  the  GATT  rules. 
We  are  asked  whether  this  is  a  case  of  corn  gluten 
today  and  soybean  tomorrow.  Our  answer  is  unequivocal. 
Action  on  soybean  is  not  repeat  not  part  of  this  package. 
We  are  also  asked  whether  this  means  that  American 
farmers  wi  li  bear  the  major  burden  of  the  reforms.  Again 
our  answer  is  clear. 
It  is  European  farmers  who  wi  11  bear  the  burden  of  these 
reforms  with  a  tough  policy  on  prices,  production  quotas, 
with  severe  penalties  for  farmers  who  exceed  them  and  a  cut 
in  financial  assistance.  Anyone  who  wonders  where  the  bur-
for  example 
den  is  should  readjabout  the  added  security  provided  for 
European  Agricultural  Ministers  when  they  visit  their 
constituents. 
. I . . . is  only  a  very  small  part  of  a  major  attempt  to  reshape 
the  Common  Agricultural  Policy,  to  cut  subsidies  and  to 
reduce  the  gap  between  EC  prices  and  world  prices.  This 
has  been  seen  in  the  United  States  as  a  golden  path  which 
we  have  been  asked  for  years  to  follow.  We  cannot  follow 
it  if  we  exempt  competing  imports  from  the  equation.  And 
I  would  add  that  since  stabilisation  of  imports  of  corn 
gluten  feed  wi  I I  mean  less  Community  wheat  being  pushed 
out  on  to  the  world  market,  measures  in  this  area  should 
be  of  direct  benefit  to  American,  Argentinian,  Australian 
and  Canadian  grain  farmers. 
So  in  summary,  Mr.  Chairman,  our  thesis  is  this. 
I 4. 
Whatever  arguments  we  have  must  be  seen  against  the  back-
ground  of  the  strong  political  links  which  bind  us,  and  the 
major  responsibilities  which  the  United  States  and  the 
European  Commu~ity  both  have  in  maintaining  the  one  world 
trading  system  and  the  prosperity  of  the  West. 
In  one  of  our  major  problem  areas,  agriculture,  we  have 
started  to  talk,  we  have  made  some  progress,  we  on  our  side 
are  making  major  attempts  to  reshape  the  Common  Agricultural 
Pol icy  and  to  reduce  our  subsidies  - a  path  along  which  you 
are  also  trying  to  go.  believe  that  our  joint  responsi-
bil ities  compel  us  to  move  along  the  road  of  co-operation 
and  not  confrontation.  We  have  made  a  start.  Let  us  con-
tinue  along  this  difficult  but  promising  road. 
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